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Abstract- This research paper covers the distribution of 
economic rent among different participants of a chains, 
as exemplified by global value chains in the resource 
management industries. Five hypotheses on the value-
added distribution in a chain were verified: (1) The 
larger the company, the more market power and 
advantages in value-added distribution it has; (2) The 
integrator of a chain (focal company) has more 
advantages in value-added distribution than other 
participants of a chain; (3) Suppliers of intellectual 
solutions have more advantages in value-added 
distribution than producers of goods; (4) The closer the 
company to the end consumer, the more advantages in 
value-added distribution it has; (5) Companies 
controlling market of final goods (brand or entry to the 
local market) have more advantages in value-added 
distribution than their suppliers. None of the mentioned 
above hypotheses are verified in accordance with 
empirical data in the selected sectors of economies. At 
the same time, it has been verified that investments in 
Research and Development, per se, do not guarantee 
any privileges in the international division of labor; 
suppliers of key parts are those who have clear 
advantages in value chains; localization of production of 
end goods is not always the right thing to do.      
Keywords: global value chains, economic rent, aircraft 
production, pharmacy, value chain, resource management, 
value added, focal company, return on total assets, average 
salary.  
1. Introduction 
Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, there 
has been a fundamental change in the system of 
international division of labor. As a result, the value 
creation concept was modified, which led to the 
international (geographical) division of production 
process. Whereas previously, raw materials, capital 
and final goods were predominantly objects of the 
international trade, now the delivery of intermediate 
goods and services is brought to the forefront in the 
international cooperation [1; 2; 3]. Therefore, there is 
a phenomenon of global value chains, which includes 
the full production cycle of goods or services 
allocated among companies in different countries. 
This covers research and development, design of a 
product, production of different components and final 
products, distribution, marketing and after-sales 
servicing. Whereas in the 1980’s and 1990’s most 
economists used the term “value chain” [4], 
nowadays it is more common to refer to “value 
chains” [5]. In our view, the term “value chain” is 
more suitable. Within the last two decades, the main 
target for most companies in global chains was the 
so-called ”promotion”, i.e. performing more 
important tasks in the production process of goods, 
indicating a share of the collective efficiency – an 
economic rent for different participants of a chain [6; 
7; 8; 9; 10]. The founder of Acer Company Stan Shih 
identified such level of importance at the different 
stages of production by means of the curve, showing 
the correlation between the production stage and 
value added. This curve was entitled “The smiling 
curve” and used by [11] while studying value added 
distribution in global value chains (GVC). According 
to their observations, the most profitable stages are 
allocated at the ends of a chain – i.e. R&D and after-
sales service, and the least profitable ones 
(manufacturing) are placed in the middle of the curve 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure1. The “smiling curve” of value-added 
distribution 
In accordance with such an idea of the chain 
structure, [12], [11] defined the main types of 
upgrading within GVN with an objective to increase 
value added (Table 1).  
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Table1. Upgrading Trajectories 
Type of Upgrading Description 
Process The increase in efficiency by means of synergy of production processes, 
management and technological upgrading 
Product The production of goods with advanced technological features 
Stages of production Movement to new higher segments in the supply chain 
Chain Changes in the whole chain for a shift to the new sector of economy 
End market Entry of firms into new end market segments, both industrial and geographical 
Production technologies Use of new technologies for lower costs 
Source: Korea in Global Value Chains: Pathways for Industrial Transformation, 2017 
 
Recently, additional global processes have resulted 
in considerable changes in the system of world 
economy and international division of labor. 
Following the global crisis of 2008-2009, there are 
four main trends that influenced the dynamics of 
global chains development: 
- Active consolidation of suppliers by the leading 
global firms for the optimization of general 
technological capability and the decrease in 
transaction costs of interaction; 
- Reorientation of chains towards Asia both in 
terms of production and sales; 
- The use of latest IT-technologies for interaction; 
- The increasing role of service links in global 
value chains. 
2. Literature Review 
Since the end of the last century the liberalization 
of trade conditions, the development of transport 
infrastructure and telecommunication technologies 
caused structure changes in different sectors of 
economy, geographical fragmentation of 
production, and vertical specialization increase 
[13,14]. As a result, the majority of production 
processes took the form of global value chains. 
Decrease in costs by transferring some operations 
into the countries with relatively cheap labor force 
was one of the main factors for trans 
nationalization of production [15]. Consequently, 
global value chains have been organized 
predominantly in labor-consuming sectors of 
economy, such as textile or electronics [16; 17, 18], 
and automotive industry [19]. Nowadays global 
value chains are the basement in the majority of 
sectors [20]. These changes were described in 
many research papers [21; 22; 23; 12; 24]. In fact, a 
new paradigm for the research of economic 
development was formed. It was considered as a 
transfer of global value chains to the segments with 
higher level of value added [14; 25; 26]. The 
specialization support in such segments is the target 
of economic policy both for developed and 
developing countries. At the same time, the linear 
approach of value added creation is changing. 
Initially, global value chain concept was the 
consequence of actions, where participants 
interacted only with neighboring parts of a chain. 
The limitation of such description is especially 
noticeable for chain markets, where competitors 
contribute to the formation of the critical mass of 
consumers and value dynamics of online goods. 
The initial logic of value chain is correlated with 
the production of traditional products but without 
full reflection of value chain mechanism typical for 
the information goods [27]. The concept of chain 
organizations can be considered as the answer to 
the discrepancy of linear process of value creation 
to many economic realities [28; 29], competition 
[30], modular organizations [31], open innovations 
[32]. These concepts enlarge possibilities of 
analysis for value creation process, and the links 
between value chains and its environment. The 
development of value chains theory summarizes 
this concept, helping analyze some business 
models, which are not included in the chain. Many 
studies of value chain process cover the value-
added distribution concept among the participants 
and the “Smiling curve” approach. The Smiling 
curve approach indicates the gap among salaries for 
labor force at the different stages of production 
process (the most qualified workers are located at 
the end of segments within value chain: research 
and development, sales and service [33]. There is a 
viewpoint that value added depends on the position 
of power for an economic subject. In accordance 
with [34], the rent of power, firstly, can be a result 
of costs transferring from the subject to the object 
of power. Secondly, the rent of power can be 
created by general decrease of costs, essential for 
the production and appropriation of goods. The 
value-added distribution in global value chains was 
first mentioned in the concept [11]. This concept is 
based on several approaches to fragmentation and 
coordination of production, including transaction 
costs [35], opportunities of chain coordination [28], 
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technological competencies [36; 21]. The following 
factors are considered as influencing the balance of 
power between partners in a chain and the value-
added distribution: (1) complexity of a deal; (2) 
complexity of transferring requirements to 
suppliers; (3) abilities of a supplier to meet these 
requirements. Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 
[11] came to conclusion that the access of emerging 
countries to global markets is dependent on their 
participation in global production chains, 
supervised by companies with headquarters in 
developed countries. The participation of emerging 
countries in global chains provides both the access 
to global markets and the improvement of their 
positions in existing chains. In particular, [in 20] 
outline that the participation in global value chains 
provides an opportunity for producers to acquire 
new competencies, to improve their own 
production processes, to achieve stable and high 
quality of goods, and also to increase speed of 
response to the market changes. This 
modernization effect is especially important for 
producers launched into the market for the first 
time [37; 38]. Gereffi explains such transformation 
with “organizational succession” or the process, by 
which producers start producing for consumers of 
low market segment, and then for consumers with 
more complicated segments of a market [15].   
2.1. Hypotheses 
The participation in value chains has led to the 
effect of collective economic rent, which is 
distributed among participants of a chain. 
Accordingly, there are questions arising – how this 
economic rent is distributed among these chain 
participants? Who of them gets more and who gets 
less? Nowadays there are four viewpoints 
concerning who has an advantage in value-added 
distribution in a chain:  
1) an integrator of a chain (focal company); 
2) a supplier of intellectual solutions; 
3) a producer of goods with higher stage of 
value added; 
4) a supervisor for the market entry. 
This research paper includes the following 
hypotheses for the value-added distribution among 
participants of a chain: 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the company, the more 
market power and advantages in value-added 
distribution it has. 
Hypothesis 2: The integrator of a chain (focal 
company) has more advantages in value-added 
distribution than other participants of a chain. 
Hypothesis 3: Suppliers of intellectual solutions 
have more advantages in value-added distribution 
than producers of goods [39]. 
Hypothesis 4: The closer the company to the end 
consumer, the more advantages in value-added 
distribution it has. 
Hypothesis 5: Companies controlling market of 
final goods (brand or entry to the local market) 
have more advantages in value-added distribution 
than their suppliers. 
 
3. Methodology 
Nowadays there are two main approaches to the 
evaluation of the total value-added distribution: the 
comparison of costs and retail prices of suppliers of 
final products and the evaluation of value added 
based on the “input-output” method.  The first 
approach is based on the comparison of direct 
material costs of a supplier of final goods and the 
price of final goods. This can be shown using the 
example of IPhone X produced by Apple Inc. 
There are 43 companies from eight countries such 
as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, etc., which are 
participating in the value chain for the production 
of this product. Two Taiwan companies organize 
the assembly: Foxconn and Pegatron, with Apple 
Inc. being the brand owner. There is a conclusion 
that the brand owner Apple company gets the 
largest share of value added, which is based on the 
comparison of retail prices for final goods (from 
USD 999 up to 1149 depending on the storage 
capacity) with the costs of parts and assembly 
(USD 370). However, this approach is not correct 
because of several reasons. Firstly, direct costs 
include not only the price of parts but also other 
components, among other things, salary. Secondly, 
nowadays, big companies have huge indirect costs, 
which sometimes are a lot higher than the direct 
ones. Thirdly, any company should recoup capital 
investments – i.e. investments in research and 
development, brand promotion, market research, 
interaction of all participants in the chain, scaling, 
etc.  The second approach implies the evaluation of 
value added distribution by means of the “input-
output” matrix. There is bottom-up and bottom-
down participation in global value chains. In the 
first case, the analysis is carried out from the 
production of raw materials up to the production of 
final goods. The value added by sectors of 
economy is divided into the value added for the 
production of final goods distributed inside the 
country, and the value added of goods and services 
exported for the production of intermediate and 
final goods in other countries. In the second case, 
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GDP consists of the value added imported from 
other countries and the value added produced 
inside the country. Then the index of a country’s 
total participation in global value chains and 
coefficients indicating the country’s commitment in 
bottom-up and bottom-down participation in chains 
are calculated based on WIOD and TiVA data. The 
second approach is suitable for the evaluation of 
value-added distribution among countries. 
However, when it comes to value-added 
distribution among the chain members, this 
approach has some drawbacks. Firstly, not all 
international transactions take place in global value 
chains. If oil, gas and other natural resources are 
supplied to wholesale distributors, then this has 
nothing to do with global value chains. Secondly, 
different chains often intermix – hence it is 
impossible to indicate participants who belong to 
one particular chain; define their roles and the level 
of dependence. Thirdly, it is impossible to trace 
cooperation links inside one country.   The authors 
of this paper have developed their own approach to 
the evaluation of value added distribution, based on 
indicators from financial reports and official 
salaries in companies, which are chain participants. 
The value added of a company can be measured as 
a sum of two values: operational profit and salary. 
However, the comparison of companies from 
different sectors of economy using absolute figures 
is not correct, because there are additional factors, 
such as the company size, capital and labor 
intensity, that influence these indicators. Therefore, 
two relative figures are considered the basis for 
comparison of members of global value chains: 
return on total assets (ROTA) of a company and its 
average salary (W).  Additionally two special 
indicators are computed:  
1) relative return on assets: 
 
Where ROTAi (%) is return on total assets in the 
company-partner i; ROTAf (%) is return on total 
assets in the focal company. 
 
Where EBIT (USD bn.) is earning before interests 
and taxes; TA (USD bn.) are total assets. 
 
2) Relative level of a salary: 
 
Where Wi (USD bn.) is average annual salary in 
the company-partner i; Wf (USD bn.) is average 
annual salary in the focal company. 
4. Findings 
The first two hypotheses have been tested on the 
aircraft and automotive industries. These two 
industries have been chosen due to their diverse 
market forms. At the same time each of the 
industries is comprised of global value chains (see 
Table 2).  
Table2. Aircraft and automotive industries 
 Market type Market form Degree of government regulation 
Aircraft industry В2В Oligopoly High 
Automotive industry В2С Monopolistic competition Low 
The civil aviation market is an oligopoly with four 
main players: Boeing, Airbus, Embraer and 
Bombardier. Other companies account for only 7 per 
cent of the market (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure2. Civil aviation market 
The turbojet market has three major players that 
complete the full production cycle – GE Aviation 
(USA), Rolls-Royce (UK) and Pratt & Whitney 
(USA). The French company Safran Aircraft Engines 
also has a significant market share, but it produces jet 
engines together with other manufacturers, most 
notably GE (see Figure 3).       
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Figure3. Turbojet market 
Four suppliers of other aircraft parts – Spirit 
AeroSystems (fuselage for Boeing), 3M Aerospace 
Sealants (insulation), Zodiac Aerospace (interior and 
electrics) and GKN (anti-icing systems) – have also 
been included in the study.  The aircraft industry data 
is given in Table 3. Information on EBIT and TA was 
found on the official websites of respective 
enterprises (average for 2015-2017). Information on 
salaries was found on the websites specializing in 
recruitment in respective countries.     
Table3. Indicators of value added in the aircraft industry (average for 2015-2017) 
 
Company 
EBIT  
(USD bn.) 
TА  
(USD bn.) 
ROTA (%) Average annual 
salary  
(USD) 
Boeing (CA), USA 3.90 47.20 8.3% 85,000.0 
Airbus, EU 2.89 53.00 5.5% 81,937.0 
Bombardier, Canada 0.27 10.63 2.6% 73,000.0 
Embraer, Brazil 0.50 9.15 5.4% 72,841.0 
GE Aviation, USA 6.15 41.75 14.7% 92,000.0 
Rolls-Royce, UK 1.21 16.99 7.1% 53,000.0 
Pratt and Whitney, USA 1.37 23.36 5.9% 88,000.0 
Spirit AeroSystems, USA 0.72 5.34 13.5% 73,860.0 
3M Aerospace Sealants, USA 7.33 33.69 21.8% 81,867.0 
Zodiac Aerospace, France 0.27 2.97 9.0% 79,102.0 
GKN, UK 0.23 1.54 14.6% 76,000.0 
 
Table 3 reveals that the first hypothesis is wrong. For 
example, the Boeing Company has a slightly larger 
market share and a much higher ROTA indicator than 
Airbus (8.3% vs. 5.5%). The ROTA indicator of GE 
Aviation (14.7%) is almost 2.5 times as high as that 
of Pratt and Whitney (5.9%), the company that has a 
similar market share. Table 4 shows the same results 
for the automotive industry. Daimler has the highest 
ROTA indicator, although its market share (2.76%) is 
significantly lower than that of other car producers. 
Ford has the lowest ROTA indicator, although it has 
the third largest market share (5.83%).   
Table4. Indicators of value added in the automotive industry (average for 2015-2017) 
Company EBIT  
(USD bn.) 
TА  
(USD bn.) 
ROTA 
(%) 
 
Average annual salary  
(USD)  
Toyota Motor 18.5 473 3.9 65,000 
Volkswagen 15.5 531.4 2.9 66,000 
Daimler 16.5 323.2 5.1 61,000 
General Motors 8.7 218.7 4.0 82,000 
Ford Motor 4.9 267.2 1.8 88,000 
Honda Motor 7.8 181.9 4.3 64,000 
Source: official websites of respective companies and https://www.payscale.com/ 
In order to test the second hypothesis we computed 
the relative return on total assets and relative salaries 
in the aircraft and automotive industries (see Tables 5 
and 6).  
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Table5. Relative return on total assets and relative salaries in the aircraft industry (average for 2015-2017) 
Integrators Boeing СА Airbus Embraer Bombardier 
Market share, % 42 41 5.8 4.2 
ROTA, % 8.3 5.5 2,6 5.4 
Average annual salary, USD 85,000 81,937 73,000 72,841 
Partners Ri  / Si 
GE Aviation, USA 1.78 / 1.08 2.70 / 1.12 2.71 / 1.26 5.75 / 1.66 
Rolls-Royce, UK 0.86 / 0.87 1.31 / 0.90 1.32 / 1.01 
 
Pratt and Whitney, USA 0.87 / 1.04 1.07 / 1.07 
  
Spirit AeroSystems, USA 1,63 / 0.87 2.47 / 0.90 
  
3M Aerospace Sealants, USA 2.63 / 0.96 
 
4.01 / 1.01 
 
Zodiac Aerospace, France 1.09 /0.93 1,65 / 0.97 
  
GKN, UK 1.77 / 0.89 2.68 / 0.93 
  
Source: calculated using information from the official websites of the respective companies 
Table6. Relative return on total assets and relative salaries in the automotive industry (average for 2015-2017) 
Integrators Toyota 
Motor 
Volkswagen Daimler General 
Motors 
Ford Motor Honda Motor 
Market share, % 9.46 7.38 2.76 4.39 5.83 5.39 
ROTA, % 4.8 7.3 3.9 1.9 1.2 5.6 
Average annual salary, USD 65,000 77,970 64,410 82,000 82,000 64,000 
Partners Ri / Si 
Robert Bosch GmbH, Germany 1.3 / 1.3 0.9 / 1.1 1.6 / 1.3 3.3 / 1.0 5.3 / 1.0 1.1 / 1.3 
Denso Corp., Japan 1.4 / 1.3 0.9 / 1.1 1.7 / 1.3 3.5 / 1.0 5.6 / 1.0 1.2 / 1.3 
Continental AG, Germany 5.0 / 1.1 3.3 / 0.9 6.1 / 1.1 12.5 / 0.9 19.8 / 0.9 4.3 / 1.1 
Magna International Inc., Canada 4.9 / 0.8 3.2 / 0.7 6.0 / 0.8 12.3 / 0,6 19.4 / 0,6 4.2 / 0.8 
Aisin Seiki Co., Japan 3.9 / 1.1 2.5 / 0.9 4.7 / 1.1 9.7 / 0.9 15.4 / 0.9 3.3 / 1.1 
Siemens, Germany 
 
3.5 / 1.0 
  
21.3 / 1.0 4.6 / 1.3 
Toyota Boshoku Corp., Japan 0.9 / 0.9 0.6 / 0.8 1.1 / 0.9 2.2 / 0.7 
 
 
JTEKT Corp., Japan 1.5 / 1.0 1.0 / 0.8 1.8 / 1.0 3.7 / 0.8 5.8 / 0.8 1.2 / 1.0 
Lear Corp, USA 2.8 / 1.1 1.8 / 0.9 3.4 / 1.1 7.0 / 0.9 11.2 / 0.9 2.4 / 1.1 
Valeo, France 1.7 / 1.1 1.1 / 0.9 2.1 / 1.1 4.3 / 0.8 6.8 / 0.8 1.5 / 1.1 
 
Tables 5 and 6 reveal that while paying similar 
salaries (Si ranges on average from 0.8 to 1.3) 
integrators usually have a lower return on total assets 
than their partners (suppliers and contractors). In 
some cases, this happens due to a low ROTA 
indicator of an integrator (e.g. Ford). In other cases, 
this occurs due to a very high ROTA indicator of a 
supplier (e.g. GE Aviation). We can see that Ri – the 
ratio of a partner’s ROTA to an integrator’s ROTA is 
usually greater than 1. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis is also wrong. The fourth hypothesis has 
been confuted as well – suppliers of key parts have a 
higher ROTA indicator than manufacturers of end 
products.  The third hypothesis has been tested on the 
pharmaceutical industry. Table 7 shows ROTA 
indicators and average salaries of the largest 
pharmaceutical firms – i.e. developers and producers 
of drugs.  
Table7. Return on total assets and average salaries in the pharmaceutical industry (average for 2015-2017)  
Pharmaceutical Company Market share, 
% 
ROTA, % Average annual 
salary, USD 
P
ha
rm
ac
eu
ti
ca
l 
fi
rm
s 
Roche, Switzerland 4.5 21.6 97,579 
Pfizer, USA 4.4 8.4 95,885 
Sinopharm, China 4.0 6.7 11,954 
Novartis, Switzerland 4.1 6.9 105,311 
GlaxoSmithKline, UK 3.4 8,7 94,194 
Johnson and Johnson, USA 3.4 13,7 92,226 
Merck and Co, USA 3.3 9.4 116,722 
D
ev
el
op
er
s 
of
 
dr
ug
s 
Eurofins, Belgium 6,5 73,029 
Laboratories Ranbaxy (Sun Pharma), India 13,9 21,958 
Strides Shasun Limited, India 11.2 14,914 
Shanghai Pharmaceuticals, China 4,9 2,366 
WuXi Biologics, China 8,6 4,120 
P
ro
du
ce
rs
 o
f 
dr
ug
s Catalent Pharma Solutions, USA 7,4 93,596 
GlaxoSmithKline Manufacturing, Italy 8,7 118,314 
Sumitomo Pharmaceuticals, Japan 7.5 116,774 
Petrovaks, Russia 31.9 10,363 
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, Puerto Rico 13.3 88,601 
Boehringer Incelheim Pharma, Germany 11.1 94,875 
Polisan, Russia 18.8 5,811 
 
Table 6 shows that the share of value added depends 
more on the company’s country of origin than on its 
position in a value chain. For example, 
pharmaceutical companies from Russia have very 
high ROTA indicators and very low salaries. The 
impact of differences in salaries on the value-added 
distribution can be seen in the diagram showing 
average salaries paid by Ford compared to average 
salaries in the industry in different countries of the 
world (see Figure 4).   
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Figure4. Average salaries paid by Ford and average salaries in the industry in different countries of the world 
 
This data also proves that control over market entry 
(see the fifth hypothesis) is not a definite advantage 
that affects the share of value added. Firms localize 
production in countries where their final goods are 
bought in order to overcome entry barriers (inter alia 
eliminate tariffs), reduce transaction costs and hire 
cheap labor force. At the same time, local firms do 
not get any advantages in the value-added 
distribution.  
5. Conclusion  
The paper examines the most popular hypotheses 
concerning the value-added distribution in global 
value chains. Every hypothesis has been tested on the 
aircraft, automotive and pharmaceutical industries. 
So far, neither hypothesis has been proved.  
Hypotheses concerning the value-added distribution 
in global value chains: 
1. The larger the company, the 
more advantages in value-added distribution it has – 
wrong. 
2. The integrator of a chain 
(focal company) has more advantages in value-added 
distribution than other participants of a chain – 
wrong. 
3. Suppliers of intellectual 
solutions have more advantages in value-added 
distribution than producers of goods – wrong. 
4. The closer the company to 
the end consumer, the more advantages in value-
added distribution it has – wrong. 
5. Companies controlling 
market of final goods (brand or entry to the local 
market) have more advantages in value-added 
distribution than their suppliers – wrong. 
At the same time, it has been revealed that  
1) average salary in a 
company’s country of origin is the factor that 
influences value-added distribution the most; 
2) Suppliers of key parts have 
an advantage in the value-added distribution 
(especially in the aircraft industry).  
These results prove that:  
- Investments in Research and Development, per se, 
do not guarantee any privileges in the international 
division of labor; 
- Suppliers of key parts have clear advantages in 
value chains;  
- Localization of production of the end goods is not 
always the right thing to do.  
However, the collected data from three industries is 
obviously not sufficient for important conclusions 
regarding value chains. Therefore, it is necessary to 
test the hypotheses in other markets.  
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